By BERGE JOLOLIAN

Turkey’s hosting of this week’s NATO summit in Ankara is worth watching closely.

Here is a country hosting the leaders of the NATO alliance while also seeking closer ties with BRICS, maintaining an independent line toward Russia and Ukraine, and still carrying the consequences of its purchase of Russian S-400 missiles. That decision angered NATO allies and led to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program. It also made U.S.-Turkish security cooperation more complicated, including around sensitive NATO-related assets such as Incirlik.

This is not about praising Turkey. Turkey has often used its geography, military weight, and regional influence in ways that have harmed Armenian interests.

But it is about understanding how states operate in today’s world.

Turkey is not thinking in simple terms of “pro-West” or “pro-Russia.” It is trying to maximize its leverage with everyone. It remains inside NATO, engages Russia when useful, looks toward BRICS for economic and diplomatic options, promotes its defense industry, and uses its position between Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to increase its strategic value.

That is strategic autonomy.

Armenia cannot copy Turkey. Armenia is much smaller, more vulnerable, and faces direct threats from Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. But there is still a lesson: states that survive difficult environments try to create options. They do not place their entire future in the hands of one patron.

This is where much of the diaspora discussion about Armenia goes wrong.

Armenia’s diplomacy is often framed as “pro-Russian” versus “pro-Western.” That is the wrong framing. Armenia is not trying to become someone else’s client. Armenia is trying to stop being one.

For decades, Armenia depended heavily on Russia for security, military protection, energy, trade, and regional access. That model failed. Russia did not prevent the loss of Artsakh. It did not prevent Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia’s sovereign territory. And now, when Armenia seeks additional partners, Moscow responds with pressure, warnings, and economic coercion.

That reveals the real issue.

Armenia is not the one demanding a rigid choice. Russia is.

Russia wants Armenia to remain exclusively inside its sphere of influence. It wants Armenia to limit its relations with the EU, the United States, France, India, and others. It wants Armenia to behave like a client state.

But Armenia’s national interest requires diversification.

That means keeping relations with Russia where necessary, while also deepening ties with the EU, the United States, France, India, Iran, Georgia, and others. It means building defense capacity, opening markets, improving connectivity, attracting investment, and reducing vulnerability to pressure from any single power.

This is not “anti-Russian” or “pro-Western” in the simplistic sense.

It is pro-Armenian statecraft.

Small states survive by creating options. They become useful, connected, and harder to pressure. They do not place their fate entirely in the hands of one patron, especially one that has already failed them.

Turkey’s diplomacy should not be admired blindly. But it should remind Armenians of something important: the world is not organized around sentiment or loyalty. It is organized around interests, leverage, geography, and power.

Armenia’s diplomacy should be judged by one question: does it make Armenia stronger, more sovereign, and less vulnerable?

If the answer is yes, then diversification is not betrayal.

It is survival.

Berge Jololian is an IT and cybersecurity specialist based in Yerevan, Armenia, who frequently publishes geopolitical and security commentary on the South Caucasus. He is an active voice in the Armenian diaspora, focusing on regional policy, Armenia’s sovereignty, and international relations.

Yerevan, Armenia

(Watertown, Massachusetts)